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Preface
The Economic Issues series was inaugurated in September 1996.
Its aim is to make accessible to a broad readership of nonspe-
cialists some of the economic research being produced in the
International Monetary Fund on topical issues. The raw material of
the series is drawn mainly from IMF Working Papers, technical
papers produced by Fund staff members and visiting scholars, as
well as from policy-related research papers. This material is refined
for the general readership by editing and partial redrafting.
The following paper draws on material originally contained in
IMF Working Paper 95/98, “Growth in East Asia: What We Can and
What We Cannot Infer From It,” by Michael Sarel, an Economist in
the Fund’s Southeast Asia and Pacific Department. It has been pre-
pared by David D. Driscoll of the Fund’s External Relations
Department. Readers interested in the original Working Paper may
purchase a copy from IMF Publication Services.
Growth in East Asia 
What We Can and What We Cannot Infer
The spectacular growth of many economies in East Asia over thepast 30 years has amazed the economics profession and has
evoked a torrent of books and articles attempting to explain the phe-
nomenon. Articles on why the most successful economies of the
region Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China
have grown, to say the least, robustly invariably refer to the phe-
nomenon as “miraculous.” When practitioners of the Dismal Science
have recourse to a Higher Power, the reader knows that he is in trou-
ble. Confusion is compounded when he discovers that ideological
debate has multiplied even further the analyses of this phenomenon.
Rather than swelling the torrent of interpretations, this paper sets for
itself the modest agenda of reviewing the weightiest arguments in the
literature that attempt to identify the reasons for the extraordinary
economic growth in East Asia and trying to decide which arguments
make sense. The exercise has value because finding the right expla-
nation might suggest how to replicate this success elsewhere and, as
a bonus, might also satisfy the reader’s urge to solve an engaging
intellectual puzzle. It is best if we start with the facts.
Since 1960 Asia, the largest and most populous of the continents,
has become richer faster than any other region of the world. Of
course, this growth has not occurred at the same pace all over the
continent. The western part of Asia grew during this period at about
the same rate as the rest of the world, but, as a whole, the eastern
half (ten countries: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and
Thailand) turned in a superior performance, although variations in
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achievement can be observed here too. The worst performer was
the Philippines, which grew at about 2 percent a year (in per capita
terms), about equal to the average of non-Asian countries. China,
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand did better, achieving
growth rates of 3–5 percent. This impressive achievement is, how-
ever, still modest compared with the phenomenal growth of Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China, known as
the “Four Tigers” because of their powerful and intimidating eco-
nomic performance. The Tigers have had annual growth rates of
output per person well in excess of 6 percent. These growth rates,
sustained over a 30-year period, are simply amazing. While the aver-
age resident of a non-Asian country in 1990 was 72 percent richer
than his parents were in 1960, the corresponding figure for the aver-
age Korean is no less than 638 percent.
This paper begins by looking at the long-running debate over the
nature of growth. Is growth the result for the most part of an accu-
mulation of manpower and machinery, or is it the result of employ-
ing the latest technology? The paper then looks at the growth record
of the four countries from three other angles: the influence of gov-
ernment intervention, the extent to which investments and exports
can be considered the main engines of growth, and the significance
for sustained growth of the economic conditions prevailing at the
very beginning of the countries’ period of extended growth. The
paper concludes with a few minimalist observations on possible
areas for future study.
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The Nature of Growth: Factor Accumulation
or Technological Progress?
Everyone agrees that the economies of East Asia, and particularlythe Four Tigers, have grown spectacularly over the past gener-
ation, but nobody seems to agree on why. The debate over why
they have grown so well in the past raises difficult questions about
regional growth in the future and about the aspiration of countries
elsewhere to replicate the East Asian success. The arguments at the
center of the debate are based on theoretical notions of growth
accounting.
This accounting method deals with three elements that contribute
to the production of goods and services: labor, capital, and technol-
ogy. Labor and capital, known collectively as the “factors of pro-
duction,” refer in this context to the workforce and to the capital
goods (buildings, machines, vehicles) that the workforce uses in
manufacturing some product or providing some service. Technology
refers to all the methods employed by labor and capital to produce
a good and depends on the development or acquisition of practical
skills to get the job done more quickly and more efficiently. No one
denies that all three elements must be present to some degree if an
economy is to grow. What is subject to debate is the contribution of
the factors of production relative to that of technology. Some believe
that increased use of labor and capital explain all growth; others are
persuaded that the answer to growth lies in the use of more efficient
technology.
Within the growth accounting framework it is possible to describe
mathematically, using a simple equation, the contributions of these
three elements to the overall production of an economy. By divid-
ing the equation by the number of people in the workforce, one can
derive a dynamic equation that shows how output per person
increases over time. Such an equation mathematically describes the
3
contribution to higher output of the growth rate of labor participa-
tion, of capital employed per person, and of technology (the latter
also known as the growth of “total factor productivity”). If applied
empirically to specific economies this equation can give a good idea
of what proportion of increased output is a result of higher labor
participation and better use of capital and what proportion is the
result of technological progress.
The traditional formulation of this equation suggests that a signif-
icant and sustained rate of technological progress is the only possi-
ble way, over the long run, for an economy to achieve a sustained
rate of growth in output per person. Why? The labor participation
rate can be increased for a while and will increase production, but
obviously it cannot increase indefinitely (everybody will ultimately
be employed). And more growth in capital than in labor ultimately
leads to diminishing returns to capital, resulting in a fall in the
growth of output even if capital continues to grow at a constant rate.
Therefore, in order to achieve permanent growth, an economy must
continuously improve its technology. This kind of growth is called
“intensive growth.” In contrast to intensive growth, increasing output
by increasing inputs of labor and capital (extensive growth) can
work only for a limited period, but it cannot last too long.
In a famous study, Solow (1956) conducted a growth accounting
exercise such as the one described above. He found that accumula-
tion of capital and an increase in the labor participation rate had a
relatively minor effect, while technological progress accounted for
most of the growth in output per person. Further studies have recon-
firmed the validity of these conclusions. Accordingly, the standard
view about the success of the East Asian countries emphasizes the
role of technology in their high growth rates and focuses on the fast
technological catch-up in these economies. In this view, these
economies have succeeded because they learned to use technology
faster and more efficiently than their competitors did.
A Contrarian View
The collapse of the Soviet Union in about 1990, after years of
apparent economic success, caught most people by surprise. This
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collapse seemed to lend credence to the “extensive growth hypoth-
esis,” which argues that the Soviet Union, after many decades of
extensive growth, ran into the inevitable diminishing returns effect,
just as predicted in the growth accounting framework, because it
had relied for its economic growth on a massive accumulation of
capital and labor and had been slow to accept innovative technol-
ogy. These developments in the economy of the Soviet Union
served to raise concerns about other economies, including some
East Asian countries, that have invested primarily in labor and cap-
ital rather than in technology over the past few decades. Krugman
(1994) makes the comparison specific:
The newly industrializing countries of Asia, like the Soviet Union of
the 1950s, have achieved rapid growth in large part through an aston-
ishing mobilization of resources. Once one accounts for the role of
rapidly growing inputs in these countries’ growth, one finds little left
to explain. Asian growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-
growth era, seems to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like
labor and capital rather than by gains in efficiency.
Likewise, in explaining the extraordinary postwar growth of the
Four Tigers, Young (1994b) concludes that
one arrives at total factor productivity growth rates, both for the non-
agricultural economy and for manufacturing in particular, which are
well within the bounds of those experienced by the OECD and Latin
American economies over equally long periods of time. While the
growth of output and manufacturing exports in the newly industrial-
izing countries of East Asia is virtually unprecedented, the growth of
total factor productivity in these countries is not.
In the same vein, Kim and Lau (1994), comparing the sources of
economic growth in these countries with those of Germany, France,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, found that
by far the most important source of economic growth in these coun-
tries [the Four Tigers] is capital accumulation, accounting for between
48 and 72 percent of their economic growth, in contrast to the case of
the Group of Five industrialized countries, in which technical progress
has played the most important role, accounting for between 46 and
71 percent of their economic growth.
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The results of these studies are not only strikingly different from
the view presented earlier of the primacy of technological progress,
but they also convey a very pessimistic message. First, economic
growth in the Four Tigers is hardly miraculous: it is just the
expected outcome of a massive accumulation of labor and capital.
Second, the progress of these economies along this growth path for
the past 30 years cannot continue. Sooner or later they will experi-
ence a dramatic decrease in growth. Third, the societies in these
countries made enormous sacrifices of consumption and leisure to
achieve these growth rates. Therefore, even if their so-called suc-
cess can be replicated in other countries, it is probably not wise to
do so.
But how conclusive are these results? In fact, conclusions based
on these studies are not very robust in that they are sensitive to the
specific assumptions of each study.
The main reason for this sensitivity is the difficulty of estimating
the rate of growth of capital stock in the East Asian countries during
the period under study. Especially in the case of the Four Tigers, for
which there are no good data before 1960, it is extremely difficult to
estimate the capital stock at that time. To estimate how much capi-
tal was available in 1960, dubious assumptions have to be made
about the depreciation rate of capital stock and about how much
investment flowed in during the years of explosive growth beginning
in 1960. What, for example, are the depreciation rates of different
types of capital (buildings, industrial machinery, computers)? Are
they equal for all countries and for all industries, or are they higher
in faster-growing economies? What method is being used to estimate
investment flows in the past?
Additional interpretational problems come from trying to estimate
the share of national income attributable to capital and the share
attributable to labor. Does the same amount of capital produce equal
income in all countries and in all industries? Can statistics about the
labor participation rate be trusted? Is the amount of effective work
proportional to the hours that people work, or does working extra
hours lead to diminishing returns? Should different types of labor
(factory, office) be summed together? How should human capital be
treated?
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Because of these unanswered and perhaps unanswerable ques-
tions, the results of studies that emphasize the contribution to
growth of capital and labor and depreciate that of technology
should not be regarded as definitive. They should be viewed as
interesting, but only suggestive.
Some Counter-Contrarian Evidence
Using conventional parameters and a conventional method of
extrapolation, we have conducted a growth accounting exercise for
the Four Tigers during 1960–90 along the lines suggested by Young
(1994a). The capital stock in these economies is assumed to be 0 in
1900 and subsequently to increase by investment flows less depre-
ciation. The intention of this exercise is to demonstrate the general
fragility of conclusions about the nature of the growth process in
East Asia.
Figures 1–4 describe the results of this growth accounting exer-
cise. Figure 1 compares the growth rates of output per person of the
Four Tigers with those of the rest of the world during 1960–75 and
1975–90. The first four bars in this figure describe the growth rates
of the individual Tigers. The fifth bar describes the simple average
growth rate of 100 countries, representing the rest of the world
(row). The sixth bar represents the mean of the growth rate of the
rest of the world plus a 1.96 standard deviation (row + 1.96sd).
Growth rates can be regarded as “high” if they are above the row
but below row + 1.96sd, “very high” if they are around row + 1.96sd,
and “outstanding” if they exceed this value. Figure 1 shows that in
this comparison the growth rates of output per person of Hong
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan Province of China were very high in the
1960–75 period and outstanding in 1975–90, while the growth rate
of Singapore was outstanding during the first period and very high
during the second.
Figure 2 describes, in the same manner, the growth rate of labor
participation, which was generally high for the Four Tigers and
outstanding in the case of Singapore during 1960–75. The first
panel in Figure 3 describes the growth rate of capital per person
during 1975–90. The rate of capital accumulation was high in Hong
7
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Figure 2.  The Four Tigers:
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Kong, very high in Singapore and Taiwan Province of China, and
outstanding in Korea. The second panel of Figure 3 describes the
estimated rate of productivity growth during 1975–90: outstanding
for Hong Kong, very high for Taiwan Province of China, some-
where between high and very high for Korea, and high for
Singapore.
Finally, Figure 4 compares the rates of technological progress
(total factor productivity) in the Four Tigers during 1975–90 with
those achieved by Japan and the United States during the same
period. The first panel of Figure 4 shows that the growth in pro-
ductivity in all Four Tigers exceeded by far productivity growth in
the United States. Three of the four (except Singapore) also
exceeded productivity growth in Japan. The second panel of Figure
4 describes the proportion of growth of output per person that is
explained by productivity growth. It demonstrates that in the case
of the Four Tigers this proportion was not systematically different
from those of Japan and the United States: for Hong Kong and
Taiwan Province of China it was slightly higher, while in the case of
Korea and Singapore it was slightly lower.
What conclusion emerges from this exercise? Although the Four
Tigers accumulated capital and increased labor participation at a
much faster rate than other economies, the increase in these two fac-
tors far from fully explains their exceptional growth rates; growth in
productivity attributable to innovative technology also accounts for
a significant fraction. In the case of Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan
Province of China, their growth rates of total factor productivity are
as outstanding as their output growth rates. Productivity growth in
Singapore is less spectacular, but is still much above the world aver-
age. As a percentage of the growth rates of output per person, the
productivity growth rates in these four economies are roughly simi-
lar to those in Japan and the United States.
A final note on the debate. Just when one seems to have arrived
at the above unambiguous and intellectually satisfying conclusions,
a nagging doubt recommends checking on how sensitive these find-
ings are to changes in the main parameters of the growth account-
ing exercise, such as the a parameter (usually at 0.3333) indicating
the relative contribution of labor and capital, the depreciation rate,
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the reference period for extrapolation, the chosen estimation
period, and the date for the beginning of capital accumulation. A
sensitivity analysis shows that most parameters do not affect the
results in any significant way, but that the a parameter and the
choice of a specific estimation period are all-important. Small,
simultaneous changes in both a and the estimation period give
results opposite to the neat conclusions presented above. The find-
ings reported by Young (1994a) regarding the low productivity
growth in the Four Tigers were obtained by using a relatively high
value for a (0.45) and a specific estimation period (1970–85). These
choices, though only slightly different from those in the baseline
calculation, together yield an estimate of productivity growth sig-
nificantly lower than the baseline result. In other words, the debate
over the relative contribution to economic growth of factor accu-
mulation versus more efficient technology is still very much alive.
Stay tuned.
Role of Public Policy
As the foregoing consideration suggests, the labor and capitalaccumulation versus total factor productivity debate remains
inconclusive. Can other factors shed light on the mystery of growth?
One suggestion is to look at the role of government.
Lucas (1988) asked, “Is there some action a government of India
could take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like
Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what, exactly?” The importance of this
question can hardly be exaggerated. A usable answer would be the
academic equivalent of alchemy, turning the dross of everyday
economics into pure gold. Accordingly, the highest ambition of
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economists who examine the East Asian success is to identify a set
of public policies that has promoted economic growth there and
gives promise of doing so elsewhere.
It should come as no surprise that opinions vary considerably
about the effect of public policy and selective government inter-
ventions on stimulating economic growth. Exponents of these opin-
ions fall into three schools. The first emphasizes the primacy of free
markets. This school requires only that the government “get the
basics right” and opposes any other kind of government interven-
tion. (Getting the basics right means creating an environment in
which the economy will thrive by, for example, making sure that the
exchange rate reflects the economic fundamentals, that interest rates
yield a positive return, that inflation is kept under control, and that
taxes are not so burdensome as to discourage economic activity.)
The second also embraces the view that the government get the
basics right, but in addition advocates selective interventionist poli-
cies, particularly in developing countries. The third, somewhat
agnostic, school denies the possibility of coming to any conclusion
about the effects of public policy or of selective interventions on
economic growth. The whole debate, according to this school, gets
you nowhere.
Free Markets
The first school, basing its views on what is known as the neo-
classical approach to economics in general and to economic growth
in particular, espouses an underlying belief in classical liberalism.
The production possibilities of any economy at any time are deter-
mined, according to this view, by the availability of physical
resources and of innovative technology. The rate of economic
growth in the long run is determined by the rate of technological
progress, which is itself a natural outcome of fierce competition in
the laissez-faire economic system. Since it regards markets as effi-
cient, this school maintains that government should confine itself to
providing public goods (roads and bridges, police protection) and
to getting the basics right and should abstain from any further inter-
vention in the market.
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This school wishes to restrict the role of government in the econ-
omy, but it is not anarchistic. It would assign to government both a
microeconomic and a macroeconomic function. In its microeco-
nomic aspect, government should ensure property rights, law and
order, and adequate provision of public goods. It should avoid high
tax rates, price controls, and other distortions of relative prices. On
the macroeconomic side, government should ensure stable and low
inflation, avoid excessive budget deficits, promote the integrity of
the financial and banking system, provide for open markets, and
strive for stable and realistic exchange rates.
Advocates of this view see the success of East Asia as the natural
outcome of these cautious policies.
Selective Intervention
The revisionist view does not share the neoclassical belief in the
efficiency of markets. It asserts that, especially in the poorer coun-
tries, markets work imperfectly. In poor countries, production cre-
ates externalities (unintended undesirable effects, such as pollu-
tion), credit is limited, and the market is a melée in which foreign
and domestic firms savage one another and the public through
unfair trade practices. Accordingly, the revisionists recommend an
activist government that will moderate the excesses of the market
and assist the orderly development of the economy by acquiring
technology and by allocating funds for useful projects that promise
a good rate of return. De Long and Summers (1991) sum up this
view: “The government should jump-start the industrialization
process by transforming economic structure faster than private
entrepreneurs would.” Advocates of this view see the success of
East Asia as confirming their conviction.
The revisionist view recognizes that the government must often
choose firm-specific, highly complex, and nonuniform interventions.
In extreme contradiction to the neoclassical doctrine, it allows, and
even recommends, the active use of tax policy to manipulate rela-
tive prices in the economy. Even the World Bank (1993) report, after
emphasizing the necessity of neoclassical “getting the basics right”
policies in East Asia, concedes that
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these fundamental policies do not tell the entire story. In each of these
economies the government also intervened to foster development,
often systematically and through multiple channels. Policy interven-
tions took many forms: targeted and subsidized credit to selected
industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on borrowing rates to
increase profits and retained earnings, protection of domestic import
substitutes, subsidies to declining industries, the establishment and
financial support of government banks, public investment in applied
research, firm- and industry-specific export targets, development of
export marketing institutions, and wide sharing of information
between public and private sectors.
Agnosticism
A third school, rejecting the claims of both the neoclassicists and
the revisionists, claims that we can say nothing meaningful about
selective interventions because we cannot properly identify how
such policies spur economic growth. There are four reasons for this
skepticism.
First, in analyzing “successful” policies, there is clear selection
bias. Success has a thousand fathers; failure is an orphan. We know
from the outset that the East Asian economies have been successful
and that therefore government intervention did not inhibit growth.
Consequently interventions in these economies are widely studied.
On the other hand, since economists find unsuccessful economies
much less attractive to study, they rarely look at government inter-
vention in economies of this type. The selection of interventions to
be analyzed is therefore skewed and is not scientifically neutral.
Second, in most cases it is impossible to offer a realistic counter-
factual scenario. Would the Hawaiians have invented innovative
igloos if it snowed a lot in Honolulu? Would the U.S. economy have
grown faster if, like the Soviet Union, its government had turned
Communist in 1917? In other words, in analyzing specific interven-
tions, we cannot address the most (and perhaps the only) relevant
question, “How fast would these economies have grown if these
policies had not been in place?”
Third, public policy in the successful East Asian economies is far
from homogeneous. Variation is large in the specific sectors and
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industries targeted for selective intervention in different countries.
The more one examines the policies individual East Asian
economies have pursued, the more evident it becomes how differ-
ent, and indeed contradictory, these policies have been. Rodrik
(1994), for example, remarks that the East Asian model encompasses
highly interventionist strategies (Japan and Korea), as well as non-
interventionist ones (Hong Kong and Thailand); explicitly redistrib-
utive policies (Malaysia), as well as distributionally neutral ones
(most of the rest); clientelism (Indonesia and Thailand), as well as
strong, autonomous states (Japan, Korea, Singapore); emphasis on
large conglomerates (Korea), as well as on small, entrepreneurial
firms (Taiwan). This range of strategies, all followed more or less
successfully, suggests that the search for a simple explanation of the
East Asian miracle may well be futile.
Fourth, determining the correct direction of causality is tricky. For
instance, in successful economies one usually finds policies that
encourage low fiscal deficits and good educational systems. Are
these policies responsible for the success of the economy, or is the
success of the economy responsible for the policies? Observing that
a specific variable is present along with growth does not necessar-
ily constitute proof that the policy generates growth. It might be the
other way around. For example, it is much easier for a government
to maintain a healthy fiscal position when the economy is growing
and tax revenues are on the increase than when the economy is
stagnant and demand is strong for deficit-creating social expendi-
tures, such as unemployment compensation. Is a small deficit a
result or is it a cause of economic growth? Conventional wisdom
relates education to wealth. But which causes which? When an
economy is booming, a government can afford generous subsidies
for education. Moreover, the demand for education increases when
an economy is growing and the population is becoming richer (it is
unnecessary for children to start working at age 12). Furthermore,
when an economy experiences rapid technological change, the
advantage of educated over uneducated workers will be greater
than when the economy is stagnant. Therefore there will be an
increase in the demand for education by individuals who want a
better job in the dynamic economy. In this case, by the way, further
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education constitutes an advantage for the specific individual rela-
tive to other individuals but does not necessarily improve the macro-
economic prospects of the economy.
These examples are presented not to prove that government
policies are unimportant, but to make the modest point that we still
understand very little about the relationship between public policy
and the extraordinary growth rates of the East Asian economies.
Other countries should be careful in trying to imitate the East Asian
policies. Not understanding the causality between growth and
industrialization, in particular, has proved to be a costly mistake for
many poor countries that pushed for rapid industrialization in a
futile effort to boost economic growth.
Investment and Exports: The Engines of Growth?
Among the many reasons suggested to account for the East Asiansuccess, the investment rate and the export orientation of these
economies enjoy enthusiastic support. These are often called
“engines of growth” because their strength seems to be pulling the
whole economy forward. Moreover, they appear to generate bene-
ficial spillover effects for the rest of the economy. The policy impli-
cation of this view is obvious. If the hypothesis is valid, the gov-
ernment should jump start the engines of growth, and if certain
sectors continue to contribute to economic progress, while others
do not, then government should assist the economy’s forward
motion by promoting the “good” sectors. Therefore, it should
encourage investments and exports, using such policy instruments
as direct subsidies or preferential allocation of credit to promote
these activities.
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Main Arguments
The view that investments and exports are engines of growth is
based on one empirical and one theoretical argument. The empiri-
cal argument is that most East Asian countries that experience phe-
nomenal growth rates also enjoy impressive rates of investment and
are successful exporters. The theoretical argument as regards invest-
ment is that a high investment rate increases the capital stock (things
used to create wealth) and that this can permanently increase the
growth rate through economies of scale (e.g., bigger, more efficient
factories, larger markets) and other beneficial side effects. In the
case of exports, the theoretical argument is that export orientation
increases the openness of the economy and, by exposing it to for-
eign technology and foreign competition, provokes a rapid rate of
technological progress.
What Is the Direction of Causality?
As stated above, a positive correlation between two variables
(where one is found, the other is found) does not prove that one
causes the other. In all the East Asian economies one can find export
orientation and rapid technological progress. How are export orien-
tation and technological progress related? The theoretical argument
suggests that because a country is oriented to exporting, it becomes
exposed to foreign technology: export orientation is the cause of
technological advance. But the opposite might also be true, that
technological advances cause export orientation. Suppose that some
industries improve their technology and others do not. It is natural
that industries with more advanced technology can compete in inter-
national markets and increase the quantity of their exports. In this
case, the data will reveal a strong correlation between export per-
formance and the rate of technological progress across industries.
Likewise, developing countries that are better in learning and apply-
ing advanced foreign technology will enjoy an advantage in world
markets and be able to sell their products abroad.
Investment rates (or equivalently, saving rates) appear to have a
causal relationship to growth rates (i.e., saving causes growth).
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Nevertheless, a strong argument of reversed causality can be made
even in this case. A study by Carroll and Weil (1994), examining data
on savings and investment within households in various countries,
found, in fact, that growth causes saving, but saving does not cause
growth. Using these data, they discovered that households whose
income is on the rise save more than households that experience lit-
tle or no growth in income, a finding that represents a powerful
reinterpretation of the growth-saving relationship. The study also
offers from its findings a theoretical explanation that recognizes
savers as creatures of habit. Although their incomes may be grow-
ing, households will respond slowly to their expanding wealth and
will increase their consumption only gradually, with the effect that
they save more. In this case, increased saving rates are caused by
increased growth rates, and not vice versa.
Initial Conditions
The main empirical argument that a high rate of investment anda concentration on exporting have caused economic growth is
the strong positive correlation between these two variables and the
rates of growth found in the East Asian economies. In particular, the
Four Tigers, the best performing economies in the region, display
exceptional investment rates and an extremely high degree of open-
ness (that is, they have a lot of exports and imports relative to the
size of the economy). The section above stressed the problem of
possible reverse causality between growth and these variables. A
further problem is that of averages. Most studies observe a correla-
tion between investment and exporting that are averaged over a
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period and a rate of growth that is averaged over the same period.
Using averages over a period obscures the relation between the vari-
ables. A simple partial solution to disentangling the skein of causal-
ity is to observe the values of the explanatory variables at the begin-
ning of the period rather than to take their average values over the
period. Finding, for example, that economies with high growth rates
during the 1960–90 period had very high investment rates or a sig-
nificant export orientation around 1960 would go a long way toward
solving the problem of reverse causality.
An examination of the dynamics of the investment rate and the
openness of the economies of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan Province of China that compares the 1960 levels of these
variables in the Four Tigers with those in other countries does not
offer much support for the view that export orientation and invest-
ment have been engines of growth. The comparison of the 1960
investment rates of the four economies with the investment rates of
100 other economies clearly rejects the view that investment rates
were high in the Four Tigers in 1960. Not only were the investment
rates in these economies low in absolute values, but they were very
modest even when compared with rates in other countries with a
comparable level of income.
The same comparative exercise can be performed to test for
openness (imports and exports as a percentage of GDP), taking into
consideration such factors as the geographical size of the country,
an important variable in determining the degree of openness of an
economy. Small countries need to trade more than large countries
with big internal markets. Reflecting this, Hong Kong and Singapore
show a high degree of openness both during 1960–90 and at the
beginning of the same period. On the other hand, Korea and Taiwan
Province of China, which are geographically much larger, were not
particularly open in 1960, either in absolute terms or relative to
other countries of comparable size.
This analysis demonstrates that high investment rates and a large
degree of openness were certainly not a general feature of the Four
Tigers in 1960. The high investment rates (Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan Province of China) and the high degree of openness (Korea
and Taiwan Province of China) were economic features that evolved
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in these economies only gradually, accompanying rather than pre-
ceding the process of economic growth. The conclusion is that the
view of these activities as engines of growth does not find much
support in the data.
Some Positive Evidence Regarding Initial Conditions
Were there other variables that characterized the initial conditions
in the East Asian countries and, if so, what contribution might they
have made to the subsequent growth of these economies? A study by
Rodrik in 1994 examined precisely this question. It was inspired by
the view that “In searching for the secrets of the East Asian miracle,
the obvious place to look is the set of initial conditions that precede
economic take-off.” Examining the initial conditions, the study finds
that, in certain important respects, they were very different from what
one would expect, given the income level of these economies.
Tracing average growth of income per person in 41 countries dur-
ing 1960–85 back to initial conditions in 1960, Rodrik shows that
countries that were poorer, but that had good primary education
systems and less inequality of income and land distribution around
1960, grew faster than the others during the following period. The
study compares actual data on education and demographics (fertil-
ity rate and mortality rate) in eight East Asian countries with the pre-
dicted values we would expect, given their initial income, and com-
pared inequality of income and land ownership around 1960 with
the same characteristics of other developing countries at a compa-
rable income level. The results show strong evidence that in terms
of initial conditions (equality of land and income, school enrollment,
high life expectancy and low fertility rates), the eight East Asian
countries were significantly better off than countries with similar lev-
els of income. These findings raise the possibility (but do not prove)
that these initial conditions may help explain the phenomenal
growth rates we observed in East Asia after 1960.
The empirical evidence presented by Rodrik regarding the possi-
ble influence of initial conditions in explaining the East Asian mira-
cle is impressive but should be accepted with caution because of the
small number of observations. Data on initial conditions in 1960,
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especially for developing countries, are rare and are of questionable
quality. While Rodrik’s results suggest a possible explanation for the
East Asian success, they are not robust enough to rule out other pos-
sibilities. Furthermore, it is not clear what the normative implications
of these findings are. For example, suppose that land equality is
indeed beneficial for economic growth. Does that mean that land
redistribution is a good policy to promote growth? Not necessarily.
The redistribution may be extremely damaging by weakening prop-
erty rights or disrupting political stability, which are obviously
essential to growth. Likewise, lowering fertility rates by government
decree may be bad for growth, even if low fertility rates are found
to be good for growth.
Concluding Remarks
The recent literature on the East Asian growth experience hassparked an intense intellectual debate. This study has attempted
to review critically the main arguments in this debate, covering some
of its most important dimensions. Inevitably, other important dimen-
sions did not receive fair representation, such as theories about non-
monotonic dynamics of growth (in which middle-income countries
can take off and grow faster than either rich or poor countries) and
about the importance of the geographical concentration of growth
successes (why is East Asia the habitat of all Four Tigers ?).
The study does not offer clear and conclusive results nor does it
make clear policy recommendations. Its main judgment is that, from
a positive point of view, a promising avenue for the explanation of
growth performance is the examination of initial conditions.
Nevertheless, from a normative point of view, it is far from clear
what specific policies governments should pursue, beyond the stan-
dard set of policies aimed at getting the basics right.
21
References
Carroll, Christopher D., and David N. Weil, “Saving and Growth: A
Reinterpretation,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
Vol. 40 (1994), pp. 133–92.
De Long, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers , “Equipment Investment and
Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 106 (May 1991),
pp. 445–502.
Kim, Jong-Il, and Lawrence J. Lau, “The Sources of Economic Growth of the East
Asian Newly Industrialized Countries,” Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies, Vol. 8 (1994), pp. 235–71.
Krugman, Paul, “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73
(November–December, 1994), pp. 62–78.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, No. 22 (July, 1988), pp. 3–42.
Rodrik, Dani, “King Kong Meets Godzilla: The World Bank and the East Asian
Miracle,” Chapter 1 in Miracle or Design? Lessons From the East
Experience, ed. by Albert Fishlow and others (Washington: Overseas
Development Council, 1994).
Solow, Robert M., “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 70 (1956), pp. 65–94.
World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,
Summary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Young, Alwyn, “Tale of Two Cities: Factor Accumulation and Technical Change
in Hong Kong and Singapore,” NBER Economics Annual, (1992) 
pp. 13–54.
——— “Lessons From the East Asian NICs: A Contrarian View,” European
Economic Review, No. 38 (April, 1994a), pp. 964–73.
——— “Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East
Asian Growth Experience,” NBER Working Paper, No. 4680 (March,
1994b).
22
Michael Sarel is an economist
in Southeast Asia and Pacific
Department of the International
Monetary Fund. He graduated
from the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem and received a Ph.D
from Harvard University.
Growth in East Asia
ISBN 1-55775-607-4
